

**UNICEF Advocacy in Emergencies**

**Case Study 4: Haiti earthquake 2010**

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## Executive Summary

This case study seeks to document UNICEF advocacy in response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010, focusing on the period January until mid-April. The report offers detailed findings (sections 1-4), based on perceptions of key actors collected in semi-structured interviews (Annex 1) and supported by a review of documents (Annex 2). UNICEF lacks an organizational policy for advocacy, and **this case study should not be read as an evaluation of UNICEF's advocacy performance**, or of the performance of individuals within UNICEF. This is one of five case studies designed to shed light on UNICEF's current advocacy practice in humanitarian situations and issues arising from it. The case studies contribute evidence to a larger Review of UNICEF Advocacy in Emergencies, which aims to strengthen the organization's advocacy in response to sudden-onset humanitarian crises. The Review is commissioned by UNICEF's Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS), and conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

The Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010 killed over 220,000 people, and affected three million people including some 1.5 million children. Many had lived in extreme vulnerability before the earthquake. After the earthquake, coordination challenges were massive, and UNICEF delivered life-saving assistance to Haitian children in the sectors of WASH, nutrition, and health.

Issues arising:

- UNICEF would have likely benefitted from a shared strategy and plan for advocacy from the outset. UNICEF appeared, eventually, to forge a coherent approach to advocacy during the three months after the earthquake
- UNICEF's offices developed a proliferation of different messaging products. 'Media messages' appeared to provide the dominant narrative for advocacy, although they were not designed for this purpose, and seemed unsuitable for it
- UNICEF advocacy involved several layers of leadership and multiple actors at all levels, but it lacked a clear process to coordinate advocacy actors during the initial phase.
- UNICEF saw uncertain benefits in advocacy collaboration at CO-level, and did not seem-adequately prepared to advocate through clusters.

**Note:** In the following sections, words contained within quotation marks represent phrases that were used in interviews or documents by UNICEF staff.



## Findings 1: Approaches

This section outlines UNICEF's approach to advocacy and related challenges in the three months after the earthquake in Haiti.

### *1.1 'Mega emergency'*

Interviews suggest the Haiti earthquake presented a particularly challenging environment for UNICEF and other humanitarian actors. The Haitian state had been devastated: 18 ministries had collapsed, with large-scale loss of civil servants, government counterparts, and senior officials. The scale of the disaster outstripped the UN's expectations, earning it the label mega emergency. UNICEF's office also collapsed, and staff were forced to work under tents for months in unfavourable conditions. These conditions did not facilitate advocacy, which was not always seen as a priority, and underscored what some saw as the need for HQ-led advocacy in what UNICEF terms Level 3 emergencies, in coordination with the Regional Office and consultation with the Country Office.

### *1.2 Implied aims*

Although not clearly defined as objectives, a review of documents suggests that UNICEF's advocacy priorities included the following:

- Targeting humanitarian actors **to improve the response**: Out of the 23 headquarters briefing notes provided for this analysis, 12 were implicitly aimed at improving the quality of the humanitarian response, mainly through better coordination. The briefing notes were for high-level meetings between UNICEF directors, IASC members, specific donors, UN special envoy Bill Clinton, and INGOs (SC, WV). Five of the news releases (out of 12) also alluded to efforts to improve the quality and coordination of the humanitarian response.
- Targeting international public and stakeholders **to raise awareness**: At least seven of the 12 news releases appeared to be mainly targeted at a general public with the aim of raising awareness of the situation of children. EMOPS prepared one briefing for DED targeted at UN member states, aimed at raising their awareness.<sup>1</sup>
- Targeting government actors **to improve policies**: EMOPS prepared several briefing notes which appeared to be aimed mainly at shaping Haiti development policies,<sup>2</sup> including linking relief and development, and shaping a transformative agenda to make a 'Haiti fit for children and youth'.

### *1.3 Support to sectors*

At CO level, actors suggest UNICEF advocacy was focused on supporting sectoral response priorities. Beginning with the CCCs, an assessment of threats to children and opportunities for making the biggest difference, UNICEF developed a 365-day plan to address key priorities. Messaging was developed accordingly, but advocacy was a secondary priority in the first few months. UNICEF's focus was on life-saving activities: mobilizing staff, receiving funding, defining priorities, launching activities, and seeking results. Its initial advocacy activities included the following:

- **Education**: UNICEF advocated with the ministry to restart education as soon as possible, and through the education cluster aiming at partners covering the country. The minister despaired in February amid the collapse of so many schools; UNICEF worked closely with the minister and partners, and succeeded in getting the schools reopened in April, saving one school year. UNICEF also helped to leverage funds, and in April, the Representative went to the EC to raise money for education in Haiti. The minister later recognized UNICEF's key contribution.

- **Nutrition:** UNICEF advocated with humanitarians to address the nutrition crisis among under-5s. It sought to bring more partners together around nutrition to build a network of NGOs, government having the information to coordinate nutrition, and donors financing agencies accordingly.
- **Child protection:** UNICEF advocated to government, humanitarians, and the media (public) about inter country adoption; it was also concerned to advocate to humanitarians about child protection risks in displacement settings. For example, advocacy was needed when humanitarian WASH technicians reportedly provided mixed-sex washing facilities without concern for women’s safety and dignity.

#### ***1.4 Inter-Country Adoption (ICA)***

Interviewees suggest UNICEF made significant efforts to advocate on unaccompanied children and Inter Country Adoption in the first six weeks. As children were being removed from Haiti by private aid groups, religious groups, and politicians without the proper process for ICA, unaccompanied children separated from parents risked being removed from the country.<sup>3</sup> UNICEF’s policy on child protection in emergencies required that identification and tracing of family carers be conducted before removing children from temporary care arrangements (e.g. with family members, neighbours etc.). ICA itself required a proper process to be followed. UNICEF advocacy on ICA included the following efforts:

- **To government:** Lacking the authority to prevent adoptions, UNICEF advocated to the government of Haiti, as well as other relevant governments including the US, France, Spain, Chile. The Representative raised the issue in daily meetings with the Prime Minister, and occasional meetings with the President. UNICEF wanted the government to take charge and make “big decisions” about child protection, but it was often unable to.<sup>4</sup> Initially, lacking experienced child protection staff, UNICEF acknowledged that it sent ‘wrong messages’ to government; its agreement to fund several orphanages and institutions ran counter to its policy to begin with a registration system (and not to create a potential magnet). Ultimately, it was considered a success when the PM issued a statement saying that any unaccompanied child leaving the country required his “personal signature”. But UNICEF was not functioning in a vacuum and a great deal of advocacy with government officials, especially on inter-country adoptions, was also said to be “undermined” by other groups such as bilateral donors and private foundations. Additionally, UNICEF conducted important advocacy efforts towards national authorities in order to “create space for the international NGOs to operate,” since officials were wary of NGOs unknown to them before the earthquake. “We spent an important amount of time and energy explaining their role and creating the links,” one interviewee said. “This is, I believe, an important function of UNICEF, through its advocacy.”
- **To humanitarians:** UNICEF’s child protection staff spent much effort explaining to the UN leadership, partners and UNICEF colleagues about the need for an ICA process; this demonstrated that such policies had not been well explained.
- **Via the media:** UNICEF communications staff contacted journalists, briefing them on the potential dangers of rapid adoption, the plight of separated children and the anguish of separated parents. As media covered airlifts of children out of Haiti, UNICEF sought to highlight successful cases of family tracing. This approach appeared to succeed in shifting news reporting from favouring rapid adoptions to warning about the risks.<sup>5</sup>

However, some observers found that UNICEF’s reliance on public communications as the primary channel for the response on ICA missed opportunities to promote child protection. ICA initially emerged as the “main issue” for UNICEF in reaction to a media agenda, emotive images, and public demands that children be “rescued”. One interviewee noted that

during the first 2-3 weeks, UNICEF lacked a clear position internally and was focused on “managing the media”. UNICEF’s policy for separated children during emergencies was not advocated strongly during the first couple weeks in Haiti. One reason suggested was a lack of capacity to provide proper life-saving support and care at that time in an impoverished country amid a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe, and another was that many adoptions were already ‘in process’ with strong support from corresponding Embassies to fast-track adoptions; the US was also one of the more stronger advocates for ICA to continue. Moreover, when UNICEF approached government missions of adoptive countries it struggled to influence their positions without being able to offer enough alternative solutions sufficiently or sometimes rapidly enough to the plight of abandoned children.<sup>6</sup>

Ultimately, actors perceived that public advocacy on ICA achieved important results. Internally, it led to the development of coherent messaging used within UNICEF, an ED statement on the topic, collaboration at HQ level with leading NGOs, and sensitization of UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador Angelina Jolie (herself an adoptive mother of three). Externally, it contributed to the Haiti PM’s issuing a statement; increased security and protection at the airport; an advisory by the US State department; and media shifting from pro-adoption to a more a rigorous understanding. UNICEF’s advocacy was thought to contribute to a new climate of awareness. When 10 Americans later entered Haiti and picked up 35 children, they were arrested and charged with abduction. This act elicited widespread condemnation.

### ***1.5 Transformative agenda***

Documents suggest that UNICEF advocacy priorities later included more strategically targeting the government of Haiti and international development actors, to promote ‘A Haiti fit for Children and Youth’.<sup>7</sup> UNICEF and regional partners<sup>8</sup> developed a vision of a Haiti “where all children and youth live a happy and healthy life, in a society that puts their interests first, in which their voices are listened to, and where their human rights are ensured and defended.” This ‘transformative agenda’ would go beyond ‘building back better’, and “ensure Haiti’s children and youth are prioritized both in the short-term emergency response and in the longer term reconstruction.” Within this agenda, UNICEF selected three priorities that would build upon its existing sectoral advocacy: (i) Education, “the key to the overall transformation of Haiti”; (ii) Nutrition, since “under-nutrition is an underlying cause of up to 60% mortality among under 5s”; and (iii) Protection, as protection challenges created by the earthquake are “well known and immense.”<sup>9</sup>

UNICEF judged itself to have “played a crucial role in advocating with government, major development partners and donors (...) for the adoption of a more transformative agenda that would enhance government capacity to manage and lead the recovery process, even in the midst of pressing humanitarian needs.”<sup>10</sup> This included further advocacy on ICA. However, such an agenda aimed beyond humanitarian goals at comprehensively upholding the rights of Haitian children.

### ***1.6 Towards government leadership***

Documents show that UNICEF’s ‘transformative agenda’ advocacy included efforts to strengthen and shape government policy. Stressing “that the ultimate responsibility for the safety, protection, health and overall wellbeing of the Haitian population rests with the Government,” UNICEF urged NGO partners to “help to shape the priorities and agenda by bringing the voices of the populace to both the political and technical wings of the Government.”<sup>11</sup>

In particular, UNICEF advocacy was judged to have contributed to strengthening the government's policy on adoptions; "successful advocacy included the Representative and the Child Protection Programme's targeted advocacy platform to encourage the Government of Haiti to sign and ratify the Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Inter-Country Adoption (Hague Adoption Convention)."<sup>12</sup>

### ***1.7 HQ-level planning***

The transformative agenda for children in Haiti was reportedly developed between the RO and HQs, showing their capacity to plan strategic advocacy. The plan was developed shortly after the earthquake, in a collaborative effort initiated by the RD. UNICEF actors convened by video conference to project the challenges to children in Haiti over the next 5-10 years. Other organizations were also involved. Without a clear process at HQ level, advocacy was being driven by the pressing issues that emerged: (i) Child protection: movement of children, adoption; (ii) Aid coordination: delays, problems of access; and (iii) Sanitation: overcrowded camps, epidemics risk, panic.

## Findings 2: Messages

This section outlines UNICEF's messaging and related challenges in the three months after the earthquake.

### *2.1 Messages articulated*

Documents suggest UNICEF's messages were articulated through news releases, media messages, and messages prepared for high level meetings. During the period 12 January to mid-April 2010, the researcher found 12 news releases published on the website, 25 sets of key messages for the media, and 17 briefing notes. The news releases included different products: 3 news notes, 3 statements, 6 press releases. The briefing notes included variously named messages: key messages, key issues, key achievements, talking points.

### *2.2 Disaster relief*

Documents suggest that UNICEF's public messages emphasized 'assistance-related' solutions to the humanitarian disaster created by the Haiti earthquake, and most did not appear to constitute advocacy. Around half of the news releases led with implied solutions, including coordinated responses, requested funding, relief supplies, immunization, residential care, and return to school. Going further in April, UNICEF said the unprecedented humanitarian response had "averted a worse crisis for children."<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile, statements by the ED, and several other news releases, emphasized problems speaking of "sadness" and "extreme concern;" media messages emphasized problems (the earthquake is a "double disaster", triggered a "children's emergency") and recovery solutions (building back better, and transformation/a Haiti fit for children).

In advocacy through private channels, many of the messages included in briefing notes for high level meetings at HQ-level emphasized aid solutions, 'building back better', and then the 'transformative agenda'. Initial messages emphasized UNICEF programmes and achievements, as well as the need to "build back better" with "children at the centre of the reconstruction effort".<sup>14</sup> By early March, UNICEF's messages shifted to emphasize the need for a 'transformative' agenda that would make 'A Haiti Fit for Children and Youth'.<sup>15</sup>

### *2.3 Few prescriptions*

Documents show how few of UNICEF's messages offered prescriptions that recommended specific actions to specific actors. In contrast to most of messages that emphasized problems and solutions, only these three sets of messages made clear calls for action from government, humanitarian and development actors:

- UNICEF and INGOs, on the eve of an international donor's conference for Haiti at the United Nations, "stressed the importance of ensuring children, young people and their families are at the centre of all rebuilding efforts."<sup>16</sup>
- UNICEF, WHO and WFP strongly urged humanitarians, the government and all who are involved in funding, planning and implementing the emergency response in Haiti "to avoid unnecessary illness and death by promoting, protecting and supporting breastfeeding and appropriate complementary feeding and by preventing uncontrolled distribution and use of breast-milk substitutes."<sup>17</sup>
- UNICEF also drafted key messages for child protection, urging that "Adoption, and particularly inter-country adoption, should not take place during the emergency phase." These were targeted and specifically tailored for children and families "on the ground", as well as other actors (media, government, embassies, Natcoms, and humanitarians).<sup>18</sup>

## ***2.4 Message proliferation***

Interviewees allude to various types of ‘messages’ used in the Haiti emergency: (i) ‘key messages’ produced by DOC and CO; (ii) messages produced by EMOPS for high-level meetings, sometimes called ‘main messages’; (iii) issue-specific messages produced by CO and HQ-based experts, such as child protection; and (iv) briefing messages for Representative’s meetings produced at CO level. Some even suggest that UNICEF’s reputation itself was a ‘message’ that called attention to children and their interests.

## ***2.5 Key messages***

Key messages provide the dominant UNICEF narrative in emergencies. Produced daily or almost daily by DOC with the CO, and sometimes including input from UNICEF experts, they were the only systematic effort to prepare and articulate UNICEF messages in response to the emergency. They were crafted for external audiences, updated daily or almost daily, distributed widely to UNICEF communications staff and Natcoms, and effectively articulated by this excellent global capacity. This implied the following risks for advocacy:

- **Functionality:** Developed for media relations, the key messages were not designed to serve advocacy. The content was developed in reaction to the international media’s agenda, and framed for the media.<sup>19</sup>
- **Quality:** Since the key messages were prepared without consulting EMOPS and others, they were thought to lack valuable layers of information: situational analysis, contextual specificity, and humanitarian knowledge. Concerns were reportedly raised within UNICEF about the quality of the key messages, which were perceived to be generic and not specific to Haiti.
- **Strategy:** The agenda set by the international media in Haiti risked shifting UNICEF’s priorities, and may have ‘distorted’ those priorities. The media narrative focused on the horrific human tragedy; children and child protection problems; and the perceived ineffectiveness of the humanitarian response (airport chaos, money not being spent). At CO level, UNICEF attempted to be ‘proactive’ with the media, showing what was working well, featuring child protection, and highlighting heroes of the earthquake.

## ***2.6 Value questions***

UNICEF’s public messages appeared to lack advocacy value. Messages emphasizing the agency’s supply of aid sat uncomfortably with humanitarian commitments. UNICEF’s public advocacy that emphasized UNICEF aid supplies as ‘the solution’ appeared to contradict broader humanitarian commitments expressed in CCCs. For example, UNICEF should not be saying “Schools are closed - and we will reopen them,”<sup>20</sup> but rather something like, “We will work with authorities to ensure that education is restored as soon as possible, and that communities are capable of re-opening schools in the near term.”

Messages emphasizing the earthquake’s impact appeared to miss opportunities to raise public awareness. UNICEF’s public advocacy that emphasized the problem, including its impact on children, missed opportunities to raise public awareness of the causes of the disaster (including ‘vulnerabilities’) and the need for immediate Haitian-owned recovery and DRR. It is arguable that UNICEF could add greater value to media coverage by sharing its expertise, instead of seeking to ‘make news’ itself. These problems raise questions about UNICEF’s media-driven communications strategy in response to the Haiti earthquake, and point to the importance of informed humanitarian advocacy within it. It also points to the need for coordination to ensure the various strands of UNICEF’s advocacy are brought together.

## Findings 3: Coordination

This section outlines UNICEF’s coordination of advocacy and related challenges in the three months after the earthquake.

### *3.1 CO Incapacitated*

CO-led advocacy was complicated by the complete incapacitation of the CO for several days after the earthquake. The Representative was out of action (stuck in Jacmel), and the Deputy not in post yet. Staff were traumatized by personal loss, and living in tents. The office had collapsed, and communications and telephone lines were down. Information about the scale and impact of the earthquake was not emerging, and “no one knew what was happening”. There was only one communications officer. Nonetheless, intense demands for information came from the RO and HQ and international media. After a week, extra communications staff and other experts were deployed; but high turnover in staff meant ‘shifting’ approaches to advocacy, especially without a written strategy.

While capacity challenges remained overwhelming, UNICEF continued to find it lacked key competencies in communications and child protection. Young inexperienced staff without media training sometimes “spoke off-message,” breaching UN norms for communications and requiring “damage control”. Child protection staff acknowledged that the “wrong messages” were sent to government and partners when UNICEF agreed to fund the opening of new orphanages – in contradiction of UNICEF policy. Further, deployment remained a problem complicated by an HR section in HQ that was hurriedly restructured following the earthquake, after being disbanded at the start of the year.

### *3.2 Rep leadership*

Despite a change in Representatives a month after the earthquake, interviews suggest that the Representative function played the lead role in UNICEF’s advocacy, working with support from surge communications staff and from the country team. In the weeks after the earthquake, the first Representative was advocating on the issue of adoption in regular meetings with the Haitian PM and occasional ones with the President, while reportedly going to the airport and stopping groups of children leaving the country. However, the change of Representatives must have left a gap in advocacy coordination, given the crucial role of the Representative in the absence of a written strategy.

The new Representative advocated intensively on education, working closely with the minister and partners to achieve the reopening of Haitian schools. The new Representative had served as a Representative many times, worked in Haiti before, spoke French, and was well-connected within the country. According to one view, **a Representative is more likely to be successful in advocacy if they have experience in UNICEF, experience in emergencies (preferably as a Representative), and key competencies in negotiation, communications, relationships, leadership etc.**

### *3.3 HQ-led engagement*

Documents suggest that UNICEF conducted active advocacy at the HQ level (between 12 January and 15 April 2010), particularly through EMOPS, ED and DED, and DOC.

- EMOPS appeared to play a very active role: EMOPS prepared 19 briefings for the ED, the DED, and other officials. The director of EMOPS advocated with IASC Principals,<sup>21</sup> European Parliamentarians,<sup>22</sup> Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF),<sup>23</sup> Canadian technical delegation,<sup>24</sup> Save the Children US,<sup>25</sup> and World Vision International.<sup>26</sup> In addition,

EMOPS prepared crisis updates to help coordinate the UNICEF-wide response, with inputs from OPSCEN, DOC, DHR, SD, PD, PARMO and inter-agency<sup>27</sup>.

- The ED and DED both played active roles: The ED issued two statements in the week following the earthquake, and visited Haiti 3-4 February and the Dominican Republic on 8 February. The ED also advocated with Canada’s Minister for International Cooperation Beverley Oda,<sup>28</sup> Special Envoy for Haiti Bill Clinton,<sup>29</sup> and the Dominican Republic’s Representative to the United Nations.<sup>30</sup> In addition, the Deputy Executive Director visited Haiti on 26 February; and also advocated with IASC Principals,<sup>31</sup> UN member states,<sup>32</sup> Canada’s Deputy Permanent Representative,<sup>33</sup> and the government of Norway.
- UNICEF published 9 news releases from New York and only two from Haiti. The Representative was quoted in one news release (5 April), and later participated in a panel discussion with NGOs on A Haiti Fit for Children.<sup>34</sup>

### **3.4 HQ support**

Interviewees suggest that UNICEF’s senior officials played a coherent role in advocacy. The ED and RD would “take the lead” on advocacy when they visited in Haiti, although the CO would prepare messages for them. The ED made statements at HQs in line with messages prepared at CO level, and other senior officials advocated with partners, Save the Children, and member states on the subject of ICA.

According to one view, CO-led advocacy was relatively informed by HQ knowledge. The communications chief was in constant dialogue with DOC, and broader discussions (along with the Representative and deputy) with other parts of the organization. Advocacy on sensitive international issues, such as ICA, required consultation with HQs. Coordination on child protection communications was eventually considered a success, with child protection expertise deployed to Haiti 3-4 weeks after the earthquake.

### **3.5 Other actors**

The RO and Natcoms also played important advocacy roles

- The RO, using the CCCs, began to prepare UNICEF’s emergency response for Haiti, and within a week deployed surge capacity for coordination, communications (media), and child protection. The RO and EMOPS worked closely together, with the RD remaining in New York for some/all of the period under review.
- Natcoms also received Q&A and other information from CO, and advocated on Haiti with their audiences, including governments and partners on the issue of unaccompanied children.

### **3.6 Process problems**

Advocacy initially lacked a structured process. Actors spoke of a “very ad-hoc and uncoordinated” approach that “began with doing key messages” for the media, **“like children running after the ball”**. Indeed, advocacy was complicated by several layers of leadership, including the ED, EMOPS, an HQ Inter-Divisional Task Force, RO, CO. It was also complicated by a multiplicity of actors at all levels, all seeking to participate in the emergency spotlight, and veering from UNICEF positions. UNICEF’s lack of an advocacy process caused pain, tension, conflict and inefficiency. The preparation of press releases was a “huge process”. According to one view, a process eventually emerged: amid a Level 3 emergency with heavy HQ/ED implications, the task force for the response provided a top-down mechanism with strict “almost-military” discipline.

After the early confusion, coordination of advocacy was facilitated by EMOPS’s collation of crisis updates. These updates served to collect information for all actors involved in the Haiti

response at the different levels. More than ad-hoc conference calls, they offered greater clarity on the source of information, findings and conclusions, and actions agreed (accountabilities). They made information available to actors who could not attend.

This case shows the need for UNICEF to adopt a clear process to coordinate advocacy during the initial phase of emergencies. Actors spoke of the need for a review, and the development of standard operating procedures to cover the following:

- What is the purpose of UNICEF's advocacy in emergencies?
- Who leads advocacy in emergencies?
- What is the accountability structure/chain of command?
- Should the ED/DED take the lead (from the Representative) when the emergency is 'global'?
- Who does what advocacy in emergencies and why?
- What role for UNICEF's various sections?
- Who does what advocacy in each sector?
- Who develops the messages?
- Who has the authority to speak?
- What process for monitoring and learning about advocacy?

More broadly, UNICEF will need to offer a functional definition of the following terms, including clarifying the differences between them, to enable these functions to work together coherently, and eliminate the tensions arising from their diverse interpretations:

- Communications
- Media relations
- Advocacy
- Public advocacy
- Policy advocacy
- Humanitarian advocacy

## Findings 4: Collaboration

This section outlines UNICEF advocacy done in collaboration with other humanitarian actors and related challenges after the earthquake.

### 4.1 *Mixed benefits*

Overall, UN-led advocacy appeared to offer mixed benefits to UNICEF. The RC/HC was perceived to play an effective role, and UNICEF found that its messages on child protection were taken up by the UN system. However, political-level coordination was not always effective after the earthquake; weekly meetings were overloaded, humanitarians were overstretched, key actors came and went, information sharing was challenging.

### 4.2 *Selective partnerships*

Documents show that UNICEF teamed up with UN partners to advocate for infant nutrition. UNICEF, WHO and WFP urged support “for appropriate infant and young child feeding in the current emergency, and caution about unnecessary and potentially harmful donations and use of breast-milk substitutes.”<sup>35</sup>

UNICEF conducted advocacy on child protection in broad collaboration with Save the Children. However, interviews suggest that some NGOs felt UNICEF worked “too much with the media”, raising questions about whether it was functioning like an NGO “selling its activities” or whether it was functioning like a UN agency “supporting government”.

UNICEF’s advocacy collaboration depended in part on good human relations. UNICEF sought to maintain good personal relationships with representatives of other UN agencies, and also perceived that its voice (and association with children) was valued by others. Therefore, UNICEF sometimes found it best to take its own positions.

### 4.3 *Clusters questions*

While UNICEF made efforts to advocate through the nutrition cluster, it seemed generally unprepared to seize advocacy opportunities arising from clusters and its role as cluster lead. There was some recognition that the agency needed to be better prepared for the cluster approach, with a better understanding of the role for advocacy within them.

- **Nutrition:** Recognizing nutrition sector as a challenge, UNICEF advocated “through the nutrition cluster” to mobilize more nutrition partners, including NGOs, to ensure country-wide coverage; to inform the government’s coordination role; and to mobilize resources from donors in support of the government strategy, so that areas were covered where needs were identified.
- **WASH:** Many resources were said to be channelled through the WASH cluster, so that UNICEF found itself acting as a “provider of first resort” instead of ‘last resort’. However, observers noted that UNICEF and partners missed advocacy opportunities; they failed to analyze and foresee the enormity of the WASH challenges, influence other actors to meet these challenges, and to also manage expectations among affected populations.

### 4.4 *NGOs for transformation*

At the regional level, documents show that UNICEF collaborated with regional NGOs to advocate for the rights of young people in Haiti. Members of the Latin American and Caribbean Chapter of the Global Movement for Children (GMC-CLAC)<sup>36</sup> “joined forces both on the ground and internationally to ensure Haiti’s children and youth are prioritized both in

the short-term emergency response and in the longer term reconstruction.”<sup>37</sup> The members included ACJ-YMCA, Defence for Children International, Inter-American Children’s Institute, Plan International, REDLAMYC, Save the Children, SOS Kinderdorf International, UNICEF, and World Vision. On the eve of an international donors conference for Haiti at the United Nations, UNICEF and these NGOs “stressed the importance of ensuring children, young people and their families are at the centre of all rebuilding efforts.”<sup>38</sup> As the Representative prepared to tell NGO partners, “this agenda is vast, ambitious and evolving – and whether or not we all reach consensus on its parameters – it is clear that we will all share collective responsibility if it fails.”<sup>39</sup>

#### ***4.5 UN statements multiply***

At the global level, documents show a surge of public advocacy by the UN system and its leadership during this time; as a UN agency and a humanitarian actor, much of this advocacy implicitly represented UNICEF. A remarkable 117 news releases were issued by the UN system in the three months following the earthquake, 52 of them in the first fortnight (12-31 January). These included statements from the various sides of the UN:

- Political leadership: 24 in voice of SG (wholly or partly) and 3 from DSG; the SG visited Haiti twice during this time: on 17 January, 14 March
- Special representatives for Haiti: 5 in voice of special envoy Bill Clinton and 6 by the Special Representative in Haiti;
- Humanitarian leadership: 11 in voice of ERC; and 4 in the voice of OCHA; ERC visited 12 February,
- Defenders of children: UNICEF and UN human rights experts on slavery; the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography; trafficking in persons; and violence against children.



## Annex 1: Interviews

Detailed interviews were conducted with the following advocacy actors in October 2010 and February 2011.

Francoise Gruloos	Representative, UNICEF Haiti (from February)
Guido Cornale	Representative, UNICEF Haiti (until February)
Manuel Fontaine	Child Protection (surge), UNICEF Haiti
Kent Page	Communications (surge), UNICEF Haiti (Jan – Feb)
Gianluca Buono	RO, Americas
Sara Bordas Eddy	Emergency Specialist (Haiti), HFSS/ EMOPS
Abhijit Bhattacharjee	Team leader, Independent Review of UNICEF's response to the Haiti earthquake

We are grateful to Rafael Hermoso, EMOPS Humanitarian Policy Section, for additional observations. We are grateful to Manuel Fontaine and Sara Bordas Eddy for their comments on the draft report.

## Annex 2: Advocacy products

This table lists UN and UNICEF advocacy products collected in response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010. Private advocacy products are shown in grey rows.

Date	Voice, Target	Product	Producer
13 Jan	UNICEF to Public	News note, UNICEF rushing supplies to quake-stricken Haiti	UNICEF HQ
13 Jan	UNICEF ED to Public	Statement by UNICEF Executive Director Ann M. Veneman on the earthquake in Haiti	UNICEF HQ
15 Jan	UNICEF to Public / Donors	Press release, UN Appeals for \$562 million for humanitarian operation in quake-struck Haiti	UNICEF HQ
16 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Press release, More UNICEF life-saving emergency supplies, experts arrive in Port-au-Prince	UNICEF HQ
16 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
17 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
18 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
19 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
19 Jan	UNICEF ED to Public	Statement by UNICEF Executive Director Ann M. Veneman on the situation of children in Haiti	UNICEF HQ
20 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: UNICEF Key Messages on Child Protection	UNICEF DOC+CP(?)
20 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
21 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
21 Jan	UNICEF, WHO, WFP to Humanitarians	Statement, Call for support for appropriate infant and young child feeding in Haiti	UNICEF HQ
22 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
23 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
23 Jan	UNICEF / UNDP to humanitarians (?)	UNICEF Inputs for Helen Clark for the Montreal Meeting 25 January on UNICEF's efforts towards Haiti's Reconstruction and Recovery	UNICEF EMOPS(?)

24 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
25 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
25 Jan	UNICEF to Public / Humanitarians	1 pager for L-G interview (25 Jan 2009)	UNICEF EMOPS(?)
26 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
27 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
27 Jan	UNICEF DED to Humanitarians	Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director, IASC Principals Consultation on Haiti	UNICEF EMOPS
29 Jan	UNICEF DED to UN Member States	Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director, Haiti member state briefing	UNICEF EMOPS
31 Jan	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
1 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
2 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
3 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
3 Feb	UNICEF to Public	News note, UNICEF Executive Director in visit to Haiti	UNICEF HQ
4 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
4 Feb	UNICEF ED to Public	Press release, UNICEF Executive Director Ann M. Veneman visits quake struck Port-au-Prince	UNICEF CO
5 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
8 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
8 Feb	UNICEF to Public / ED to Public	Press release, UNICEF Executive Director visits Haitian earthquake victims	UNICEF HQ
11 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
16 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
18 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
23 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
26 Feb	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
26 Feb	UNICEF DED to Public / Humanitarians(?)	Press release, Much more needs to be done to help Haiti's children, says UNICEF Deputy Executive Director	UNICEF CO
1 Mar	UNICEF to Humanitarians	Briefing Note for the Special Envoy for Haiti - President Clinton	UNICEF EMOPS(?)
2 Mar	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
2 Mar	UNICEF ED/DED to Humanitarian	Briefing Note for the Office Executive Director, Meeting with Canadian Deputy Permanent Representative accompanied by Officer in Charge for Humanitarian Issues	UNICEF EMOPS
8 Mar	UNICEF ED to Humanitarians	Briefing Note for the Executive Director, Meeting with Special Envoy for Haiti, President Bill Clinton, and NGOs leaders	UNICEF EMOPS
10 Mar	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
12 Mar	UNICEF ED to Humanitarians	Briefing Note for the Executive Director, Ad hoc IASC Principals meeting on Chile and Haiti	UNICEF EMOPS
19 Mar	UNICEF to Public	Haiti Earthquake: Key Messages	UNICEF DOC
30 Mar	UNICEF + NGOs to Public / humanitarians	Joint press release, A Haiti fit for its children and young people	UNICEF HQ
30 Mar	UNICEF to Humanitarians / Govt / Public	Representative Briefing Note and Suggested Remarks, NY NGO Forum – A Haiti Fit for Children	UNICEF CO / EMOPS
30 Mar	UNICEF to MEPs / Humanitarians	Briefing Note for Mr. Louis-Georges Arsenault, Director EMOPS, Meeting with the European Parliament Delegation (MEP members of the	UNICEF EMOPS + PARMO(?)

		Development & Humanitarian Committee)	
31 Mar	UNICEF to Humanitarians	Briefing Note for EMOPS Director Meeting with Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)	UNICEF EMOPS
Undated	UNICEF DED to Norway / Humanitarian	DED meeting with Norway	EMOPS
1 Apr	UNICEF ED to Canada	Office of the Executive Director Briefing Note for Executive Director Ann M. Veneman's Meeting with The Honourable Beverley J. Oda, Minister for International Cooperation, Canada; Discussion on G8 Summit and Preparatory Process	EMOPS and PARMO
5 Apr	UNICEF to Public	News note, Three months after earthquake, more children have chance to return to learning in Haiti	UNICEF CO
9 Apr	UNICEF to Canada / Humanitarian	Briefing Note for EMOPS Director Meeting with Canada delegation	UNICEF EMOPS and PARMO
12 Apr	UNICEF to Save the Children / Humanitarian	Briefing Note for EMOPS Director - Meeting with Save the Children	UNICEF EMOPS
13 Apr	UNICEF to Public	News note, After January's quake, humanitarian action in Haiti averts worse crisis for children, but much remains to be done	UNICEF CO
13 Apr	UNICEF to World Vision int'l / Humanitarian	Briefing Notes for EMOPS Director - Meeting with World Vision International (WVI)	UNICEF EMOPS
15 Apr	UNICEF ED to Dominican Republic	Briefing Note for Executive Director's Meeting with H.E. Mr. Federico Alberto Cuello Camilo, Permanent Representative of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations	UNICEF CO (DR) and GMA

<sup>1</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director; Meeting: Haiti member state briefing; 29 January 2010

<sup>2</sup> One of these was aimed at reinforcing cooperation with the Dominican Republic.

<sup>3</sup> UNICEF, in its report, *Children of Haiti Three Months After the Earthquake; Progress, Gaps and Plans in Humanitarian Action: Supporting a Transformative Agenda for Children* (UNICEF, April 2010, pp29-32) describes its initial response to child protection. In its report *Children of Haiti: Milestones and looking forward at six months* (UNICEF, July 2010, pp.10-13), UNICEF adds that child protection risks "increased manifold as the earthquake exacerbated a preexisting crisis by collapsing an already inadequate and weak system that was failing to protect those most vulnerable. Children in Haiti are now caught in the midst of a child protection emergency of unprecedented magnitude."

<sup>4</sup> UNICEF reportedly tried to get Haitian authorities to lead/co-lead the cluster on child protection, but government officials rarely showed up and expressed suspicions about NGOs. The situation improved over time, but belatedly.

<sup>5</sup> UNICEF's communications officer at the time briefed CNN's Anderson Cooper, who perceptibly changed his line on adoptions from unquestioning support to focusing on the need for a proper process

<sup>6</sup> It was further pointed out that UNICEF did provide some alternatives, but not in sufficient quantity or rapidly enough.

<sup>7</sup> The Global Movement for Children, Latin American and Caribbean Chapter (GMC-CLAC) 2010; 'A Haiti Fit for Children and Youth,' (draft 15 February 2010)

<sup>8</sup> The Latin American and Caribbean Chapter of the Global Movement for Children (GMC-CLAC)

<sup>9</sup> UNICEF Haiti: Representative Briefing Note and Suggested Remarks; NY NGO Forum – A Haiti Fit For Children, 30 March 2010

<sup>10</sup> UNICEF, Country Office Annual Report 2010, February, 2011 (For internal use only); this document continues: "Inter-Country Adoption already lacked safeguards in Haiti before the earthquake, and UNICEF was already working and advocating for reform and alignment with the principles of the Convention. The earthquake strongly exacerbated child protection challenges however, and brought the issue of international adoption to the fore. It however also generated momentum to initiate reform of the intercountry adoption framework and address protracted child protection concerns including the link between the lack of governmental control of

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residential care centres and the premature /illegal adoption and trafficking of children. Positively, a bill on reforming the framework for inter country adoption was introduced in the Haitian Parliament in 2009 and adopted by the lower Chamber in May 2010 but the bill was not fully aligned to the principles enshrined in the Hague Convention. In June 2010, following strong advocacy by the UNICEF Representative with Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive, coupled with technical assistance provided by the UNICEF Child Protection Programme, the Prime Minister submitted a request to the Secretariat of the Hague Convention announcing his intention for Haiti to become a party to the Convention, and requesting technical assistance from the Secretariat of the Convention and from UNICEF. This represents a great victory in advocacy, although additional work is required to ensure signature, ratification and positive outcomes for children.”

<sup>11</sup> UNICEF Haiti: Representative Briefing Note and Suggested Remarks; NY NGO Forum – A Haiti Fit For Children, 30 March 2010

<sup>12</sup> UNICEF, Country Office Annual Report 2010, February, 2011 (For internal use only); this document continues: “Inter-Country Adoption already lacked safeguards in Haiti before the earthquake, and UNICEF was already working and advocating for reform and alignment with the principles of the Convention. The earthquake strongly exacerbated child protection challenges however, and brought the issue of international adoption to the fore. It however also generated momentum to initiate reform of the intercountry adoption framework and address protracted child protection concerns including the link between the lack of governmental control of residential care centres and the premature /illegal adoption and trafficking of children. Positively, a bill on reforming the framework for inter country adoption was introduced in the Haitian Parliament in 2009 and adopted by the lower Chamber in May 2010 but the bill was not fully aligned to the principles enshrined in the Hague Convention. In June 2010, following strong advocacy by the UNICEF Representative with Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive, coupled with technical assistance provided by the UNICEF Child Protection Programme, the Prime Minister submitted a request to the Secretariat of the Hague Convention announcing his intention for Haiti to become a party to the Convention, and requesting technical assistance from the Secretariat of the Convention and from UNICEF. This represents a great victory in advocacy, although additional work is required to ensure signature, ratification and positive outcomes for children.”

<sup>13</sup> See UNICEF Report, Children of Haiti: Three Months After the Earthquake,

<sup>14</sup> ‘Building Back Better’ was the original message promoted by UNICEF during January; see the EMOPS Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director Meeting with IASC Principals on Haiti, 27 January 2010

<sup>15</sup> ‘A Haiti Fit for Children and Youth’ became UNICEF’s message in March; see EMOPS Briefing Note for the Executive Director’s Meeting with Special Envoy for Haiti, President Bill Clinton, and NGOs leaders, 8 March 2010

<sup>16</sup> Joint press release, A Haiti fit for its children and young people, (New York, 30 March 2010)

<sup>17</sup> Statement, Call for support for appropriate infant and young child feeding in Haiti; (UNICEF/WHO/WFP, New York, 21 January 2010)

<sup>18</sup> Email message from UNICEF Media Section

<sup>19</sup> It was also suggested that messages could have been better tailored to media -- if they concentrated less on UNICEF’s actions (i.e. information-sharing), and offered more distinctive news and views to the media.

<sup>20</sup> DOC, Key Messages 17 January 2010;

<http://www.intranet.unicef.org/geneva/panorama.nsf/2ad00c83daa1137dc12573160062f788/473e07ac9049c913c12576ae0048d630?OpenDocument>

<sup>21</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for the Executive Director; Meeting: Ad hoc IASC Principals meeting on Chile and Haiti; Friday 12 March

<sup>22</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for Mr. Louis-Georges Arsenault, Director EMOPS; Meeting with MEP members of the Development & Humanitarian Committee, 30 March 2010

<sup>23</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for EMOPS Director Meeting with Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF); Meeting: Informal discussion on Haiti with MSF; 31 March 2010

<sup>24</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for EMOPS Director Meeting with Canada delegation; 9 April 2010;

<sup>25</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for EMOPS Director - Meeting with Save the Children; Meeting with: Save the Children US; 12 April 2010

<sup>26</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Notes for EMOPS Director - Meeting with World Vision International (WVI) Meeting with: Ian Ridley, World Vision’s Director for Humanitarian Programming; 13 April 2010

<sup>27</sup> E.g. EMOPS Briefing, Update on the Haitian emergency, 14 January 2010; EMOPS Briefing, Update on the Haitian emergency, 8 February 2010; EMOPS Briefing, Update on the Haitian emergency, 2 March 2010;

<sup>28</sup> EMOPS, Office of the Executive Director, Briefing Note for Executive Director Ann M. Veneman’s Meeting with The Honourable Beverley J. Oda, Minister for International Cooperation, Canada; Discussion on G8 Summit and Preparatory Process; Thursday 1 April 2010

<sup>29</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for the Executive Director: Meeting with Special Envoy for Haiti, President Bill Clinton, and NGOs leaders; 8 March 2010

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<sup>30</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for Executive Director's Meeting with H.E. Mr. Federico Alberto Cuello Camilo, Permanent Representative of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations; 15 April 2010

<sup>31</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director, IASC Principals Consultation on Haiti, 27 January 2010,

<sup>32</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for the Deputy Executive Director, Haiti member state briefing, 29 January 2010

<sup>33</sup> EMOPS, Briefing Note for the Office Executive Director; Meeting with Canadian Deputy Permanent Representative - Mr. Normandin (accompanied by Officer in Charge for Humanitarian Issues at the Mission), 2 March 2010

<sup>34</sup> UNICEF Haiti: Representative Briefing Note and Suggested Remarks; NY NGO Forum – A Haiti Fit For Children, 30 March 2010

<sup>35</sup> Statement, Call for support for appropriate infant and young child feeding in Haiti; (New York 21 January 2010)

<sup>36</sup> The Latin American and Caribbean Chapter of the Global Movement for Children (GMC-CLAC) is made of up organizations, networks, and institutions operating at the regional level for the promotion and protection of the human rights of children and adolescents within the framework of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Global Movement for Children (GMC) was established as a result of the Special Session on Children of the UN in 2002.

<sup>37</sup> The Global Movement for Children, Latin American and Caribbean Chapter (GMC-CLAC) 2010; 'A Haiti Fit for Children and Youth,' (draft 15 February 2010)

<sup>38</sup> Joint press release: A Haiti fit for its children and young people, (New York 30 March 2010)

<sup>39</sup> UNICEF Haiti: Representative Briefing Note and Suggested Remarks; NY NGO Forum – A Haiti Fit For Children, 30 March 2010